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I. France
1.  In France, the work for the transposition of the 
Directive began in the first term of 2016. Due to 
constitutional reasons, some parts of the Directive 
should be transposed through a law, but the government 
decided not to go before the Parliament and to adopt 
an ordinance. The process was achieved on March 9, 
2017, with the adoption of the Ordinance No. 2017-303, 
which has been completed by a decree. The new texts 
entered into force on March 10, 2017, without retroactive 
application, except for the provisions dealing with access 
to evidence.
2. Several remarks can be made on the drafting process.
– First, in France, texts in competition matters are 
usually under the responsibility of the Ministry 
of Economy, but here the leading ministry was 
the Ministry of Justice. This is easy to understand 
since most of the new rules are modifying civil 
procedure rules and rules on liability.
– Second, and it is rather unusual for this kind of 
text, the ministry of Justice organised some informal 
consultations with the stakeholders (mainly with 
associations of specialised lawyers, academics) before 
writing a first draft. A short public consultation of 
two weeks was organised afterwards in September 
2016 on this first draft. Pursuant to the comments 
received, some changes were introduced, mainly on 
technical points. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice 
took the opportunity of partially implementing 
another directive, the Directive  2016/943/EU on 
business secrets.
–  Third, the amended draft written by the 
Ministry of Justice was, as usual, reviewed by 
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AbstrAct
The majority of Member States have implemented the European Directive 
on Private Damages Actions for Breach of Competition Law, into their respective 
law, albeit with some delay. In particular, England, Germany, and the Netherlands, 
but also France and Italy have faced a certain number of private damages actions 
well before the implementation of the new regime. Partly the national rules and 
legal innovations have inspired the European legislator. 
La majorité des États-membres de l’Union européenne a transposé la Directive 
européenne sur les actions en dommages et intérêts du fait de pratiques 
anticoncurrentielles, quoiqu’avec quelques mois de retard, dans leurs droits 
respectifs. Ce sont notamment l’Allemagne, l’Angleterre et les Pays-Bas, 
mais aussi la France et l’Italie, qui ont connu un certain nombre d’actions privées 
bien avant la transposition du nouveau régime. Ce sont en partie les règles 
et innovations juridiques nationales qui ont inspiré le législateur européen. 
Overview
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the Conseil d’État. Before issuing the official 
review, the counsellor in charge of the matter 
also organised informal meetings with judges and 
academics to receive comments. New changes 
were again introduced. Most of them are justified 
by constitutional reasons, to be in line with the 
respective fields of law and decree, or are technical 
improvements.
3. On the final result, short comments can be made since 
the political line was clear. The Ministry of Justice has 
been required to work on a “a minima” implementation. 
The consequences are twofold:
– First, there is no change in the Civil Code or 
in the Civil Procedure Code. The new texts have 
been inserted in the book IV of the Commercial 
Code (hereafter “Com. C.”) dealing with 
competition law. This book now contains a new 
title VIII: “Des actions en dommages et intérêts du 
fait des pratiques anticoncurrentielles” (Damages 
actions for anticompetitive practices). These are 
deemed to be “special rules”. Therefore, general 
rules on liability and procedure remain in force 
for all issues not covered in the new title. In most 
cases, rules of the Civil Procedure Code will be 
applicable, but, if  an administrative judge has 
jurisdiction to deal with the case, rules of the 
Administrative Justice Code will be applicable. 
–  Second, it explains that the new provisions 
are strictly limited to damages actions. They do 
not cover other types of private actions such as 
actions for breaches of contracts, nullity… That 
is the main issue raised by this text, since there are 
in France many contractual actions, mainly in the 
field of distribution.
However, there is an exception to the principle of a 
limited implementation. The new rules apply to every 
infringement of antitrust rules, both European and French 
ones. In French law, it covers not only the equivalent of 
Articles 101 TFEU and 102 TFEU, like violations of 
Articles L. 420-1 and L. 420-2 Com. C., but also specific 
French anticompetitive practices, like the prohibition of 
too low prices and new specific prohibitions of Articles 
L. 420-2-1 and L. 420-2-2 Com. C.
4.  To conclude, the new texts seem to be in line with 
the Directive, even if  the government did not take the 
opportunity to deal with all issues raised by the private 
enforcement in the French context. However, the courts 
will probably have to deal with many difficult issues, like 
for instance the identification of the persons who are 
liable. The French texts refer to the legal person, either 
individual or natural person, and not to the undertaking, 
which exists neither in civil law nor in civil procedure rules. 
However, in Article L. 481-2 Com. C., which deals with 
the binding effect of CA’s decisions, there is an indirect 
reference to the parent company to which infringement 
has been attributed. It will be the choice of the victim to 
also sue the parent company. 
L. I.
II. Germany
5. On June 9, 2017, the Ninth Amendment of the Gesetz 
gegen Wettbewerbsbeschränkungen (“German Act 
against Restraints of Competition—ARC”) entered 
into effect, introducing important changes to German 
competition law. Whilst the implementation of the EU 
Damages Directive1 remains the main reason and subject 
matter of the reform, the German legislator also used 
the amendment as an opportunity to adapt German 
competition law to the challenges of the digital economy, 
through a broad range of additional modifications. 
On March 9 and 30, 2017, the German Parliament 
(Bundestag and Bundesrat) adopted the final text of the 
Ninth Amendment. The text is based on two different 
proposals. Its main basis is the Regierungsentwurf (Draft 
Law)2 issued by the Federal Government on September 
28, 2016. The Economic Committee of the Bundestag 
proposed further modifications,3 which the Parliament 
subsequently adopted as the definitive new law. The 
German legislator decided to forego the possibility 
of transferring the changes required by the Directive to 
other branches of German tort law. In some cases, rather 
the opposite is accurate for Germany—e.g., the limitation 
period of damage claims starts in accordance with the 
commencement of the standard limitation period4, i.e., 
only at the end of the year in which the damage arose 
(§ 33h para. 2 ACR 2017).5 
1. Coming into force and scope 
ratione temporis
6.  The majority of the new provisions come into force 
with retrospective effect as of December 27, 2016 (§ 186 
para. 3 ARC). Yet, the new substantive law on damages 
only applies to claims for damages arisen or arising after 
December 26, 2016. There are extra rules with regard 
to the provisions on limitation and suspension of the 
limitation period. These provisions are applicable even 
to pre-existing claims, provided they have not already 
been time-barred at the time of the coming into force of 
the new provisions. Thus, the legislator tries to preclude, 
all disputes relating to the scope ratione temporis of  
these provisions, which have been crucial in many cases 
German courts have to and had to deal with in the past. 
2. First wave of reforms by the 
Seventh Amendment in 2005 
7. The Seventh Amendment of the German Act against 
Restraints of Competition renewed the legal framework 
1 Directive 2014/104/EU.
2 Bundestagsdrucksache (Bundestag Document) No. 18/10207.
3 Bundestagsdrucksache No. 18/11446.
4 See the general rule in § 199 para. 1 Bürgerliches Gesetzbuch (German Civil Code).
5 See infra Topic 4: Limitation periods – Germany. Ce
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of private damages actions in the case of violation of 
competition law for the first time in Germany in 2005. At 
that time, German law had already featured many of the 
Commission’s proposals as published in its Green Book 
dating from 2005. The legislator, inter alia, significantly 
broadened the circle of potential claimants by 
abandoning the quite narrow “Schutzgesetzerfordernis,” 
“Protective Law Requirement,” as established by different 
German courts. As the meaning of this criterion was not 
very clear, and some authors and lower courts argued 
that even direct purchasers had no standing to sue the 
members of a cartel, as the conspiring parties did not 
specifically direct their cartel against their commercial 
partners, but rather, only aimed at raising prices.6 Other 
important changes and innovations in the field of private 
antitrust actions that were present in the German law of 
2005 are as follows:
–  A provision on the “passing-on-defence,” 
at once restricting, but not excluding the 
possibility for defendants to invoke it (§  33 
para. 3 sent. 2 ARC 2005);
–  The granting of prejudgment interest in favour 
of victims of a violation as of the moment in 
which the damage occurred (§ 33 para. 3 sent. 4 
and 5 ACR 2005);
–  The binding effect (and not only prima facie 
evidence) of decisions issued by competition 
authorities—even including those arising other 
Member States, and thus going beyond the 
requirements of Article 9, paragraph 2, of the 
Directive; 7
–  The suspension of the period of limitation 
during administrative procedures (§ 33 para. 5 
ARC 2005); 8
–  The possibility for the judge to reduce 
unilaterally the value in dispute (and thus 
reducing the legal costs for the claimant) in 
order to reduce the financial risk of instituting 
legal proceedings for claimants (§  89a 
ARC 2005);
–  The right of associations to claim the 
absorption of the infringing party’s profit 
(Vorteilsabschöpfung). However, one must 
mention that this instrument has never been 
used in practice, as the association in question 
has to deliver the profit to the Federal Budget 
(§ 34a ARC 2005).
6 For more details, see W. Wurmnest, A New Era for Private Antitrust Litigation in 
Germany? A Critical Appraisal of  the Modernized Law against Restraints of  Competition, 
6 German Law Journal 1174 (2005), online available at https://static1.squarespace.com/
static/56330ad3e4b0733dcc0c8495/t/56b8f51a2eeb817f29ab4316/1454961947041/
GLJ_Vol_06_No_08_Wurmnest.pdf. 
7 See infra Topic 3: Binding effect of  decisions of  national authorities – Introduction with 
remarks on Germany.
8 See infra Topic 4: Limitation periods – Germany.
3. Case law 
8.  The quite famous ORWI judgement of the 
Bundesgerichtshof (German Federal Court of Justice) in 
20119 led to further clarifications including the so-called 
pass-on defence, the standing of indirect purchasers, 
joint and several liability of co-infringers and the 
price effects in the time after a cartel agreement had 
come to an end. Other court judgments contributed to 
clarifying important issues and to building up a quite 
exhaustive body of case law. For instance, it is settled 
case law in Germany that there is prima facie evidence 
that at least long-lasting cartels lead to inflated prices, 
and thus to damages sustained by those purchasing the 
cartelised product.10 Later, the Directive required from 
the legislators of the Member States the adoption of 
a corresponding provision (Art. 17 para. 2 Directive), 
which was codified by the German legislator in §  33a 
para. 2 ARC  2017. The study of the huge number of 
decisions11 concerning the scope of the binding effect of 
administrative decisions (§ 33b ACR 2017)12 might help 
to understand possible problems of the new provision, 
and might provide some suggestions as to how to deal 
with them. In fact, even before the implementation of 
the Directive, virtually all decisions imposing a fine for 
competition law infringements are followed by one or 
more private damages actions by alleged victims of the 
infringement seeking redress. 
4. Measures the German 
legislator had to implement
9.  Despite a yet quite elaborated legal framework, the 
German legislator needed not only to modify some 
already existing provisions, but also was required to 
implement several completely new provisions of the 
Directive. Amongst these new provisions, the most 
important change for Germany were the provisions on 
inter partes document disclosure.13 It must be emphasised 
that the German legislator even went as far as to create 
a substantive right to disclosure, which can be claimed 
both, in the context of a pending damages action as well 
as in a separate proceeding—e.g., in order to facilitate 
out-of-court settlements. 
The amendment also aligns the German liability 
regime to that of the EU. As is well-known, under EU 
competition law, the existing ”single economic entity 
9 For more details, see Bien, Concurrences, No. 1-2012, Art. No. 42396, pp. 231–233.
10 Landgericht (Regional Court) Mannheim, Judgment of  4 May 2012, 7 O 436/11 Kart – 
Feuerwehrfahrzeuge (Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb DE-R, p. 3584, 3588.)
11 E.g., Bundesgerichtshof  (Federal Court of  Justice), Judgement of  12 July 2016 - KZR 
25/14 – Lottoblock  II, Neue Juristische Wochenschrift  2017, p.  1714; Landgericht 
(Regional Court of) Köln, Judgement of  17 January 2013 - 88 O 1/11 – Deutsche 
Telekom, Beck Rechtssatz 2013, No. 08412; Oberlandesgericht (Higher Regional Court 
of) Düsseldorf, Judgement of  29 January 2014 – VI-U (Kart) 7/13, Beck Rechtssatz 2014, 
No. 1737, Wirtschaft und Wettbewerb, DE-R, p. 4477 seq. 
12 For more details infra Topic  3: Binding effect of  decisions of  national authorities – 
United Kingdom with remarks on Germany.
13 See infra Topic 1: Disclosure of  documents that lie in the control of  the parties – Germany. Ce
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doctrine”14 allows the Commission to impose a fine 
not only against the subsidiary having performed the 
infringement, but also against the parent company even 
in cases in which the parent company had no knowledge 
of its subsidiary’s actions. The Commission considers 
that the “undertaking” that committed the infringement 
is not necessarily the same as the legal entity within a 
group of companies whose representatives actually took 
part—e.g., in cartel meetings. Already in the Eighth 
Amendment of 2013, the German legislator tried to close 
possible enforcement gaps, by introducing the possibility 
for the Bundeskartellamt (Federal Cartel Office) to 
impose fines on a legal entity that is the legal successor 
of an entity having committed the infringement. In its 
most recent Ninth Amendment of the ARC, the German 
legislator takes a further step by introducing new rules on 
the liability of parent companies and of legal successors 
in § 81 para. 3a–3e ARC 2017, thus bringing German 
liability law largely in line with the European model. 
Interestingly, the German legislator, in defiance of the 
requests made by many scholars, has not carried out 
the changes necessary to apply the same concept in civil 
law cases. Practice has to wait for clarification of the 
meaning of the term “undertaking,” as used in Article 1, 
paragraph 1, Directive by the ECJ. 
F. B.
III. Italy
10. The Damages Directive is an exercise in frustration 
and a glaring example of how EU competition policy 
may lose its legitimacy in the eyes of the European 
citizen. The Ashurst Study on the conditions of claims 
for damages in case of infringement of EC competition 
rules, prepared for the Commission in 2004, which is 
really in many ways the first formal step undertaken by 
the Commission on the way to the Directive, opened by 
stating that “the picture” emerging from the study was 
“one of astonishing diversity and total underdevelopment.”
11.  Commissioner Kroes referred to such statement in 
her speech at the Harvard Club in 2005— pre-dating the 
adoption of the Green Paper, the first official act properly 
by the Commission, stating: “(...) my spontaneous feeling 
is that private enforcement is by nature complementary 
to and even strengthens the enforcement actions taken by 
competition authorities.” In short the Commission had 
noticed that private enforcement was in a lamentable 
state and that the only way to get it on its feet was going 
to be giving some kind of boost to private, stand-alone 
private enforcement. This would, in addition, so Ms. 
Kroes again, have the benefit of allowing competition 
agencies to focus more on their enforcement priorities. 
14 See in particular ECJ, Judgment of  10 September 2009, Case C-97/08 – Akzo Nobel NV 
and Others v. Commission.
12.  Now, you could be for or against a US-type of 
enforcement, but clearly the US experience gives us 
a huge range of devices which any European Union 
or Member State body may choose from in order to 
make antitrust private enforcement effective: jury trials, 
pre-trial discovery, opt-out class actions (references to 
collective actions abound in the earlier Commission’s 
documents but they tend to disappear from the scene 
later on), punitive damages (which the Directive now 
even effectively bans, rather incongruously given its 
EU status and hardly an incentive to more effective 
enforcement), third-party funding, contingency fees, 
etc. By merely reading the Directive now, some twelve 
years down the line, you have the clear impression that 
the system may have gone awry: the whole Directive 
hinges clearly on the assumption that most enforcement 
will be follow-on (a sobering result, given the premisses, 
as said), and only enhances very timidly (and, in so far 
as particular jurisdictions may already have an efficient 
system, does not enhance at all) the efficiency of the 
private enforcement national systems, first of all in 
the more sensitive areas, i.e., evidence gathering and 
collective actions. 
13.  That said, the Italian law enforcing the Directive 
is most notable for the rather unusual rapidity which 
characterised its adoption. It is mainly a diligent and 
technically savvy (except for a few quirks here and there, 
as we shall see) transposition of the text of the Directive, 
with a limited amount of independent thinking. 
 C. O.
IV. Netherlands
14.  Although the Directive allows, at least with regard 
to some issues, that the Member States implement 
wider measures than the Directive provides for,15 the 
Netherlands has chosen to do no more than the Directive 
requires. This is in accordance with the Dutch so-called 
“Directions for law making.”16 Therefore, the Dutch 
implementation legislation applies only to cross-border 
infringements of competition law and to the so-called 
parallel application of competition law (in case an 
infringement of national competition law has an effect on 
the trade between the Member States).17 The government 
intends to make the provisions of the Implementation 
Act applicable to strictly national cases, but will do so in a 
separate act. That act must still be put before parliament.
15.  The Dutch implementation legislation consists of 
the Implementation Act Directive Private Enforcement 
of Competition Law (Implementatiewet richtlijn 
15 For example, with regard to disclosure: see Art. 5, para. 8, Directive.
16 Aanwijzing 331 of  the Aanwijzingen voor de regelgeving.
17 Explanatory Memorandum (Memorie van Toelichting), Tweede Kamer  2015 – 2016, 34 
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privaatrechtelijke handhaving mededingingsrecht).18 A 
draft of the implementation legislation was published in 
October 2015. It was subject to an Internet consultation 
from 8 October 2015 until 22 November 2015. This led 
to twelve reactions. Some of the reactions gave rise to 
amendments, mainly on technical points. The amended 
draft act was put before parliament on 12 February 2016. 
The Act was published in the State Gazette (Staatsblad) 
on 9 February 2017. It entered into force on the 
subsequent day, i.e., 10 February 2017.19
16. The Implementation Act provides for additions to the 
Civil Code (Burgerlijk Wetboek; Book 6; Articles 6:193k 
through 6:193t were added)20 and the Code of Civil 
Procedure (Wetboek van Burgerlijke Rechtsvordering; 
Articles  161a and 844 through 850 were added).21 In 
addition, Article 44a of the Code of Civil Procedure was 
amended22 in order to enable the court to resort to the 
National Competition Authority (Autoriteit Consument 
en Markt or “ACM”) for help with the determination of 
the quantum of damages.23
17. Article III provides for the temporal application of 
these new or amended provisions, but only in part. Taken 
literally, it provides that Article  6:193s Civil Code and 
the pertinent provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure 
will not apply to cases of which the court was seized 
prior to 26 December 2014. This is the implementation 
of Article 22 of the Directive. Article 22, paragraph 1, 
Directive provides that its substantive provisions must 
not apply retroactively. Article 22, paragraph 2, Directive 
then says that all other provisions (the non-substantive 
provisions) shall not apply to actions for damages of 
which the court was seized prior to 26 December 2014. 
National law determines when the court is seized of an 
action.24 Pursuant to Article 125, paragraph 1, Code of 
Civil Procedure, a court is seized of an action as soon 
as a writ of summons (dagvaarding) has been served on 
the defendant. At this stage, the court is not necessarily 
aware of the action. The writ of summons must set a date 
for the defendant to appear before the court (this is an 
administrative appearance for the record only). No later 
than one day before this date, the claimant must file the 
writ of summons with the court.25 If  he or she fails to do 
so, and does not repair this failure within fourteen days, 
the court is no longer deemed to be seized of the action.26 
In theory, it is therefore possible that claimants, who 
served a writ of summons before 26 December 2014 but 
set a date of appearance after this day, did not file their 
writ of summons with the court. Rather, they may have 
18 Stb. 2017/28.
19 Art. IV Implementation Act.
20 Art. I Implementation Act.
21 Art. II under B and under C Implementation Act.
22 Art. II under A Implementation Act.
23 As per Art. 17, para. 3, of  the Directive
24 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 26.
25 Art. 125, para. 2, Code of  Civil Procedure.
26 Art. 125, para. 3, Code of  Civil Procedure.
started a new action in order to be able to make use of 
the procedural provisions of the Implementation Act.27
18. Article 22, paragraph 1, Directive did not need separate 
implementation. In principle, the material provisions 
apply from the day on which the Implementation Act 
came into force.28 
19. Article III Implementation Act erroneously refers to 
Article 6:193s Civil Code. This is a provision on the statute 
of limitation. That is a substantive provision.29 This 
happened, because the draft Implementation Act that 
was put up for consultation contained an Article 6:193m 
that provided that the infringer commits a wrongful 
act towards a party that suffers damages as a result of 
the infringement.30 This was considered superfluous. 
Therefore, the original Article  6:193m was deleted and 
the other provisions were renumbered. As a result, the 
original Article  6:193s, which was a non-substantive 
provision,31 became Article  6:193r and Article  6:193t 
became Article 6:193s.
20.  The Netherlands has already seen quite significant 
activity in the area of private enforcement of competition 
laws. Damages claims have been filed in The Netherlands 
in relation to the airfreight cartel, the sodium chlorate 
cartel, the elevator cartel, the paraffin wax cartel, the 
CRT cartel and the gas insulated switchgear cartel 
to name but a few. As a result, a body of law already 
developed prior to the introduction of the Directive and 
the Implementation Act, often building on provisions in 
our Civil Code or Code of Civil Procedure that existed 
already. As a consequence, the legislator found that 
a number of provisions of the Directive did not need 
implementation. This, inter alia, applies to:
– Article 3, paragraph 2, Directive that the party 
that suffered harm is entitled to full compensation 
and that this must include actual loss and loss 
of profit, plus the payment of interest. It was 
considered that these principles are already 
part of Dutch law. That is true. However, an 
issue may arise if  interest in the meaning of the 
Directive means the actual interest that could 
have been obtained on a savings account for 
example. In The Netherlands, claimants will need 
to rely on statutory interest,32 absent a separate 
implementation of Article 3, paragraph  2, 
27 This may, of  course, have implications for the satisfaction of  statutes of  limitation. Under 
Dutch law, the original writ of  summons would interrupt the statute of  limitations (cf. 
Art. 3:316, para. 1, and Art. 3:317, para. 2, Civil Code).
28 Cf. Art. 68a, para. 1, Transition Act Civil Code; “old” law may remain applicable if  the 
damage arose or came to light after the entry into force of  the new law, but arises from 
the same event that caused damage the liability for which is governed by the “old” law; cf. 
Art.173, para. 1, Civil Code.
29 Cf. Art. 15, sub h, Rome II.
30 h t t p s : / / w w w. i n t e r n e t c o n s u l t a t i e . n l / i m p l e m e n t a t i e w e t _ r i c h t l i j n _ 
privaatrechtelijke_handhaving_mededingingsrecht.
31 It provides that the court may stay the proceedings for up to two years in case of  
extrajudicial dispute resolution (cf. Art. 18, para. 2, Directive).
32 Art. 6:119 Civil Code. Ce
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Directive. This statutory interest is fixed by the 
government from time to time and may be less or 
more than the actual interest on a savings account 
from time to time.
–  Article  3, paragraph  3, Directive which 
says that full compensation shall not lead to 
overcompensation.
F. K.
V. United Kingdom
23.  First, a disclaimer: I have been asked to report on 
the United Kingdom. However, I will largely restrict 
my remarks to the law of England and Wales. This is 
not because I have inside information about a future 
break-up of the United Kingdom after Brexit. Nor is it 
because of any presumption of English superiority over 
the Scots. The reason is primarily that I know too little 
about the separate legal system that is Scots law to say 
anything meaningful about it, at least not without talking 
nonsense. The Northern Irish system is not as distinct 
from the English legal system as Scots law, but especially 
in the institutional rules there are differences as well. In my 
contributions to this Concurrences issue, I will endeavour 
to mention divergences from English law in Scotland 
and Northern Ireland where they are of relevance to the 
implementation of the Directive. Concentrating on the 
law of England and Wales is perhaps justifiable in so far 
as the majority of competition law actions are, and at 
least until Brexit will continue to be, brought in London. 
1. Brexit
24. Before turning to the implementation of the Damages 
Directive in the UK, it is necessary to address the elephant 
in the room. It is unclear what the effects of Brexit on 
private damages actions in the UK will be, largely because 
no-one knows what shape Brexit will take. A quick recap 
for those just awaking from a coma: In the autumn of 
2015, the Conservative party under David Cameron’s 
leadership received an unexpected absolute majority 
in an election fought on a manifesto that promised to 
keep the UK in the Single Market but to hold an In/Out 
referendum about the UK’s membership in the EU. On 23 
June 2016, the voters decided by 51.9% to 48.1% to leave 
the European Union. David Cameron stepped down, 
and none of the previous Leave campaigners stepped up. 
Theresa May became Prime Minister without election 
in the party after the challengers withdrew. Having 
campaigned (very half-heartedly) for Remain, the new 
Prime Minister sought to brandish her Leave credentials 
and stepped up the anti-EU rhetoric at the Conservative 
party conference in October 201633 and her Lancaster 
33   See the transcript in Theresa May’s keynote speech at Tory conference in full, 
The Independent, 5 October 2016, http://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/
theresa-may-speech-tory-conference-2016-in-full-transcript-a7346171.html (or watch at 
https://youtu.be/08JN73K1JDc). 
House speech in January 2017.34 Freedom of movement 
of workers and oversight by the Court of Justice of 
the European Union were defined as being red lines for 
Her Majesty’s Government, and leaving both the Single 
Market and the Customs Union was determined to be a 
necessary consequence. It emerged that the EU did not 
particularly fancy giving the UK an EU à la carte, so that 
it looked as if  things were tumbling inexorably towards 
an increasingly hard Brexit, at a minimum leaving the 
Single Market and the Customs Union, perhaps even 
without an exit deal. After having ruled out holding a 
snap election several times, Theresa May changed her 
mind in light of the 20% poll lead of the Conservatives 
over Labour in spring 2017 in order to form a “strong 
and stable government.” The result of the general election 
held in June 2017 was that the Conservatives lost their 
absolute majority in Parliament, with a surprisingly 
strong showing of Labour under the socialist leader 
Jeremy Corbyn, resulting in a hung parliament and a 
government (propped up by an understanding with the 
Northern Irish party DUP) that was described as “weak 
and wobbly” rather than “strong and stable.” Talk of a 
softer Brexit, with overtures towards Single Market/EEA 
membership (the “Norway solution”), or even remaining 
in the EU, has begun to gain a little traction, but freedom 
of movement of workers and Court of Justice oversight 
are still considered red lines by the current Prime Minister 
Theresa May. Something would have to give for the EEA 
solution — or even remaining in the EU — to become 
viable. Doubts have been raised about PM Theresa May 
remaining in office, having lost even the support of the 
right-wing press, and being described as a “dead woman 
walking” by the former Chancellor George Osborne.35 
25. Given the twists and turns over the last year, which 
would have made William Shakespeare envious, I will 
refrain from making any predictions about the future 
of Brexit. Perhaps this is what “Brexit means Brexit” 
stands for. Especially if  a harder form of Brexit mate-
rialised, this would arguably make private enforcement 
in the UK less attractive. Recognition and enforcement 
of the judgment would not benefit from the Brussels I 
(Recast) Regulation any more.36 Even before the infor-
mally so-called “Great Repeal Bill” (technically: the 
“European Union (Withdrawal) Bill”) was introduced 
on 13 July 2017, it was considered likely that the current 
34   See the transcript in Theresa May’s Brexit speech in full, The Telegraph, 17 
January 2017, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2017/01/17/theresa-mays-brexit-
speech-full/ (or watch at http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/av/uk-politics-38687842/
theresa-may-s-brexit-speech-in-full).
35 Samuel Osborne, George Osborne says Theresa May is a « dead woman walking - it’s just 
how long she’s going to remain on death row », The Independent, 11 June 2017, http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/george-osborne-theresa-may-dead-woman-
walking-death-row-andrew-marr-show-a7784181.html.
36 Specifically for competition law: Sir Peter Roth, Competition law and Brexit: the challenges 
ahead, Competition Law Journal 2017, 5, 9–10; F. Wagner-von Papp, Competition Law in 
EU Free Trade and Cooperation Agreements (And What the UK Can Expect after Brexit) 
(March 1, 2017), forthcoming in European Yearbook of  International Economic Law 
2017 (EYIEL 2017), working paper at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2961721, section 5.2. 
Generally, see A. Dickinson, Back to the future: the UK’s EU exit and the conflict of  
laws, Journal of  Private International Law 2016, Vol. 12(2), 195–210; M. Lehmann and 
D. Zetzsche (2016) Brexit and the consequences for commercial and financial relations 
between the EU and the UK, European Business Law Review 2016, Vol. 27(7): 999–1027. Ce
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binding effect of Commission decisions would be aboli-
shed.37 The Bill now confirms this fear. It provides that 
a court or tribunal “is not bound by any principles laid 
down, or any decisions made, on or after exit day by the 
European Court” and “need not have regard to anything 
done on or after exit day by the European Court, another 
EU entity or the EU but may do so if  it considers it appro-
priate to do so”.38 The Competition and Markets Autho-
rity can, after exit day, only apply the Competition Act 
1998 (not Articles 101 and 102 TFEU), will lose access 
to the European Competition Network, and may there-
fore also become a less important source of infringement 
decisions on which domestic follow-on actions could rely. 
Accordingly, most commentators see the attractiveness 
of the UK as a forum for damages actions as waning, at 
least for follow-on actions based on Commission deci-
sions issued after exit day.39 Others are more optimis-
tic and have pointed out that some of the very attrac-
tive features of the UK system would still draw claimants 
to courts in the UK regardless of Brexit.40 Perhaps. Not 
being able to rely on Commission decisions for follow-on 
actions is clearly a serious drawback, as are the compli-
cations in the laws of conflicts. Be that as it may, we will 
turn to the, for now, attractive features of the UK private 
enforcement regime.
2. Private enforcement before 
and after implementation
26.  The UK has long been one of the most attractive 
jurisdictions for private enforcement. Especially 
the well-established disclosure regime favourable to 
claimants, which is described in more detail in the 
separate contribution on inter partes disclosure, gives 
the UK an advantage over its “competitors” in other 
EU Member States. Even before the Damages Directive 
was implemented, the legislator had introduced further 
features that strengthen the attractiveness of the UK 
system: the Consumer Rights Act 2015 gave in s 81 
effect to Schedule 8 of that Act, which changed the 
Competition Act 1998 by introducing various collective 
37 Sir Peter Roth, a judge at the High Court and the president of  the Competition Appeal 
Tribunal (CAT), has even called this conclusion “inescable.” P. Roth, Competition law and 
Brexit: the challenges ahead, Competition Law Journal 2017, 5, 9 (but noting that in a 
stand-alone action, such a decision would be taken into account).
38 Clause 6 of  the European Union (Withdrawal) Bill. The Bill and its progress can be 
accessed at http://services.parliament.uk/bills/2017-19/europeanunionwithdrawal/
documents.html.
39 See, for example, Richard Whish, Brexit and EU competition policy, Journal of  European 
Competition Law and Practice 7(5) (2016), 297–298, and the interview An Antitrust 
Conversation with Richard Whish QC, December 2016, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.
com/knowledge/videos/144930/private-enforcement-of-competition-law-in-the-eu; Sir 
Peter Roth, Competition law and Brexit: the challenges ahead, Competition Law Journal 
2017, 5, 10 ; John Ratliffe & Cormac O’Daley, Brexit and Competition Law : What to 
expect, WilmerHale briefing, 15 September 2016, http://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/
brexit-and-competition-law-what-to-72034/.
40 Jenny Rayner, Interview with Edward Coulson & Julia Joseph : What does Brexit mean 
for public and private enforcement of  competition law in England and Wales?, LexisPSL, 
26 July 2016, http://www.blplaw.com/media/download/What_does_Brexit_mean_for_
public_and_private_enforcement_of_competition_....pdf  (the ‘positive’ effect that they 
identify, namely that after Brexit claimants would not have to wait for final judgments by 
the Court of  Justice, is illusory : after Brexit, such actions would have to be stand-alone 
actions, and such actions can be brought in parallel already today).
proceedings including opt-out proceedings,41 allowed 
stand-alone claims (as well as follow-on claims) to be 
brought in the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT), and 
harmonised the limitation periods in the High Court and 
the CAT to six years.42
27.  Most of the UK private enforcement regime had 
already complied with the requirements of the Damages 
Directive. The remaining implementing changes were 
made by “The Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising 
from Competition Infringements (Compeitition Act 
1998 and Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 
2017,” Statutory Instrument 2017 No. 385,43 which, 
under its very helpful Regulation 1(1), may be cited as 
“The Claims in respect of Loss or Damage arising from 
Competition Infringements (Compeitition Act 1998 and 
Other Enactments (Amendment)) Regulations 2017”—a 
very catchy short title. I will rebel and simply call them 
the “2017 Regulations.” They were made on 8 March 
2017, and in accordance with regulation 1(2) came into 
force on 9 March 2017.
28.  The 2017 Regulations primarily modify the 
Competition Act 1998 by its regulation 2, which 
gives effect to Schedule 1 of the 2017 Regulations. In 
particular, Schedule 1 of the 2017 Regulations inserts the 
new Schedule 8A into the Competition Act 1998. 
29. Part 1 of this new Schedule 8A to the Competition Act 
1998 (para. 1 to 7) contains definitions, implementing, with 
modifications, Article 2 of the Damages Directive. Part 2 
of Schedule 8A (para. 8 to 11) contains rules on pass on, 
implementing Chapter IV of the Damages Directive. Part 
3 (para. 12) implements the SME protection contained 
in Article 11(2), (3) of the Damages Directive. Part 4 
deals with cartels (as defined in para. 4), establishes the 
presumption of harm (para. 13 implementing Art. 17(2) 
of the Damages Directive), and deals with the liability of 
immunity recipients and the corresponding contribution 
issues (para. 14 to 16). Part 5 of Schedule 8A (para. 17 to 
26) covers the limitation and prescriptive periods. Here, 
the differences between the legal systems in England 
and Wales, Northern Ireland and particularly Scotland 
do play a role. The limitation period in England & 
Wales and Northern Ireland is six years, the prescriptive 
period in Scotland is five years,44 but provision is made 
for the beginning of these periods in paragraph 19, and 
for the suspension and extension of these periods in 
paragraphs 20 to 25, in particular suspension during the 
investigation by the competition authority (para. 21), 
during consensual dispute resolution (para. 22), and 
during collective proceedings (para. 23). Part 6 deals with 
disclosure. As will be explained below, the disclosure 
41 The first application for a collective proceedings order (CPO) under the new rules was 
made in Dorothy Gibson v Pride Mobility Products Ltd [2017] CAT 9 (http://www.
catribunal.org.uk/files/1257_Dorothy_Gibson_Judgment_CPO_CAT_9_310317.pdf).
42 Consumer Rights Act 2015, c. 15, http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2015/15/
contents/enacted, in Schedule 8.
43 http://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/2017/385/pdfs/uksi_20170385_en.pdf.
44 In Scotland, both “limitation” and “prescription” exists, but the former is applicable only 
to personal injury claims. Prescription, unlike limitation, extinguishes the obligation 
completely. Ce
 d
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rules in the UK had already exceeded the standard of the 
Damages Directive, and so the main modifications are 
the restrictions of disclosure in the cases of the grey and 
black lists of Articles 6 and 7 of the Damages Directive 
for investigation materials, and in particular settlement 
submissions and leniency statements (para. 28, as defined 
in para. 4(4), (5), (6) and para. 5), investigation materials 
(para. 29, as defined in para. 3(3)). The only extension 
of  the disclosure regime that was necessary to implement 
the Damages Directive was to enable courts in Northern 
Ireland to order disclosure in paragraph 31 (a power that 
had already existed in England and Wales and Scotland). 
Part 7 implements in paragraphs 32 to 34 the limitations 
of admissibility of evidence contained in Article 7 of the 
Damages Directive. Paragraph 35 implements Article 9 by 
qualifying decisions by other Member States’ competition 
authorities or review courts as prima facie evidence. Part 
8, consisting only of paragraph 36, prohibits the award 
of exemplary damages in competition proceedings.45 
Part 9 covers consensual settlements and the effects on 
contribution, implementing Article 19 of the Damages 
Directive and changing the previous default rule for who 
bears the shortfall in the case of a consensual settlement 
that underrepresents the share of the settling infringer. 
This will be explored in more detail below in the section 
on the effect of consensual settlements. 
45 For the narrow circumstances in which exemplary damages were available, see the 
summary in F. Wagner-von Papp, Implementation of  the damages directive in England 
and Wales, On-Topic Implementation of  EU Directive 2014/104/UE, Concurrences No. 
2-2015, reprinted in Concurrences 2017 English Edition, 23, para. 6 and 7.
30. If  it were not for Brexit, the established practice on 
disclosure, the undoubted expertise in particular of the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, and the new possibility 
of opt-out proceedings would seem to make the UK a 
Mecca for damages claimants. Competing jurisdictions 
vying for these damages actions may still hope for British 
self-mutilation through a hard Brexit.
F. W.-v. P. n
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